JAMES RENWICK, LL.D.

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CHAPTER XIV.

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Origin and Growth of the Democratic Party. – Its Triumph in the Election of Jefferson. – George Clinton chosen Vice-President in the place of Burr. – His Pretensions to be the Successor of Jefferson. – He is passed over. – Jealousy of Virginia. – All Aid to the New-York Canals is refused. – Dewitt Clinton is named as a Candidate for the Presidency. – Examination of his Course in relation to the War.

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The party which assumed to itself the exclusive title of democratic was made up of many heterogeneous materials. It had been organized, in the first instance, as an opposition to the administration of Washington, on the questions of the proclamation of neutrality and the ratification of Jay’s treaty. This opposition was gladly joined by the remnant of the anti-federalists, and by many of the more warm federalists, who had been disappointed in obtaining office under the new government. The cabinet of Washington had been itself divided on these questions, and thus the secretary of state became the most prominent man of the new party. Even among the anti-federalists the shades of opinion were various in the extreme, from those who would have been content with a federation possessing even less than the limited powers to which the old Congress had restricted itself, to those who desired a strong and firm central government, but preferred that its popular branches should possess a greater degree of authority, and the power of the executive be more limited than had been done by the Constitution. The two most opposite opinions were thus united in opposition on a single point, that which held the exclusive authority of state sovereignties, and that which was for deriving all power without intervention from the people. The party therefore strengthened itself to the South among the rich and powerful planters, who possessed a local influence which the action of the general government diminished; while it numbered to the North the hardy yeomanry, who retained the revolutionary feeling which had led to the breaking up of entails and the abrogation of manorial privileges. Propagating in the latter case the doctrine of the largest liberty, the party was joined by all the foreigners who had fled from the oppression of their native governments. The natives of England and Scotland, on the other hand, who sought to become citizens of the United States for the purposes of commerce, were ranged in the federal party.

The question of a national bank produced a new point of difference between those who admitted that the Constitution gave every power incident or collateral to those actually granted in terms, and those who adhered to the mere letter of the instrument.

So long as Washington retained the office of president, his transcendent greatness of character, and the strong hold he held on the affections of his countrymen, prevented the rising party from taking the form of a steady and uniform opposition. He had himself the faculty of training to his service talent of every variety, and making the most discordant opinions work together for the promotion of the general welfare. Jefferson and Hamilton, the imbodied personifications of the two most opposite opinions, were both retained in his cabinet, and were both efficient in bringing to a successful result the difficult experiment of a form of government without example, as it has hitherto been without parallel.

The determination of Washington to retire from a station that he might have held so long as it pleased him, was the signal for the organization of the two opposing parties. Adams, the Vice-President, became the candidate of the one, and Jefferson of the other. A new element of division was thus introduced, for sectional feelings were enlisted in the disputes, and attempts were mutually made to array the North against the South. Adams was elected in preference to his competitor; and, had he possessed either popular arts or clear-sighted views, might have secured the constant triumph of the party which had supported him. In the former, however, he was deficient, and his want of popularity was aggravated by two injudicious acts, by which the liberty of the press was menaced, and the right of personal liberty invaded. The alien and sedition laws, of which he was, in popular opinion, the instigator, furnished his opponents with a well-founded means of attack. He still had one chance of retaining his power. The aggressions of Great Britain on our commerce had been almost put an end to by the operations of Jay’s treaty, while those of France were not only continued, but were aggravated by a feeling growing out of that very treaty. Hence a good and just cause of war against that nation arose, and hostilities were actually commenced by a law authorizing the capture and detention of French cruisers and privateers. To carry on these hostilities a navy was created, and, for less obvious reasons, an army was imbodied.

A universal burst of popular feeling hailed the war with France, and the leaders of the opposition were thus left without the means of attacking the administration with success. The strong feeling of national pride was about to be awakened, and this, as in 1813, would probably have swept away every landmark of party.

It appears probable that the great preparations of the administration of Adams had other views than mere defensive operations. The strengthening of the navy was well calculated to place the United States in an imposing attitude in respect to Great Britain, as well as to clear the seas of the picaroons bearing the French flag. But the well-organized and admirably-equipped army, of which Hamilton was in the actual, although Washington held the nominal command, was not called for by any fear of invasion from France, and the course of events appeared to be throwing the United States into an alliance with Great Britain.

It may therefore appear far from improbable that a great scheme of conquest and national aggrandizement had been planned in the secret councils of the federal party. Cuba was the receptacle of the bucaneer who preyed upon the neutral commerce of America, and, from the alliance of Spain with France, must have become the centre of any hostile action on the part of the former. It was, of course, obvious that, when the hostilities against France should become a formal war, Spain would in fact, if not by absolute declaration, become a party to it. It is therefore not an unlikely surmise that the army of 1798 was intended to act against the Spanish colonies of Louisiana and Florida, nay, perhaps with the aid and concurrence of Great Britain, against Cuba, or Mexico itself.

The obvious tendency of the acts of the administration of Adams, whether so intended or not, to bring the United States into the coalition against revolutionary France, furnished the opposition with a bond of union. By this it was kept together, in spite of the heterogeneous character of the materials of which we have seen it to be originally made; and the habit of acting in concert under a steady discipline, either fused all the various opinions into one common mass, or silenced the expression of such as were not avowed by the papers which became the organs of the party. In the faith thus publicly expressed the younger portion of the community was educated; and what may have at first been no more than an assumption of principles calculated for political effect, became the sincere belief of at least half of the youth of the United States.

Whatever may have been the intentions of the party with which he acted, Adams did not carry out even the first steps of the plan. Instead of exciting the hostile feeling against France to the height of a war in all its forms, he sought and effected a reconciliation with that country. By this the numerous active spirits who had sought occupation in arms, or had enrolled themselves as volunteers, were disgusted, and many of them were speedily classed in the ranks of his opponents. His own party was distracted, and yielded him only a feeble support, or sought to abandon him for some more acceptable candidate. In the mean time, his administration did not adapt its measures to the new state of things; the army was not disbanded; measures for the increase of the navy were persisted in; and the taxes imposed in view of a war were not taken off. His adroit adversaries seized on these points of his policy as open to attack, and in the outcry raised against a naval force, a standing army, and taxes in time of peace, found the most efficient weapons for overthrowing his power.

In this they were so successful that they ventured on running two candidates for the presidency, in order to secure both that office and the place of vice-president to members of their party. This was rendered necessary by an existing provision of the Constitution, which has since been repealed, by which the office of vice-president fell to the candidate for the presidency who should receive the second number of votes.

The result of this bold measure in the election of Jefferson as President, and Burr as Vice-President, and the suspicion of an attempted collusion with their federal opponents, to which the latter was exposed, are familiar facts.

In this struggle and final triumph the elder Clinton bore an important part, and Dewitt Clinton figured towards its close as an efficient agent. They had, as we have seen, been among the moderate opponents to the federal constitution, on the ground of state rights; and although George Clinton had finally acquiesced in the vote of the state convention, he had been immediately assailed by an opposition to his re-election as governor. Thus driven into opposition, he had become the decided supporter of Jefferson, and had aided most powerfully in securing to him the vote of New-York. In the intrigues by which Burr was so near taking the first instead of the second rank, the friends of the Clintons were the undeviating supporters of Jefferson.

We have seen the prominent part which Dewitt Clinton took in the Senate of the United States in support of the administration of Jefferson. His seat in that body was held for a short time, and with this short exception, he, with his uncle, whose re-election as governor accompanied the triumph of the democratic party, were fully occupied by their executive duties and the party struggles of their own state. On the re-election of Jefferson, George Clinton became vice-president, and a wider field of politics was opened. From former usage, he felt himself entitled to be considered as the person to be selected as the candidate of his party for the office of president. On the other hand, Virginia was unwilling to part with the prescriptive claim to that office, and the secretary of state seemed to be preferred by the incumbent of the office; mutual jealousies arose, and the general administration manifested neutrality in the schisms of the party in New-York, if not actual preference for those who had been denounced by it.

With a just sense of duty to the country at large, and his native state in particular, George Clinton urged measures of preparation for defence, and particularly the fortification of the harbour of New-York. He also appears never to have been in favour of the entire disbandment of the army, or the neglect of the navy. The embargo received his warm support, not as a measure intended as a substitute for a war with England, but as one of direct preparation; and we have on it on record that he urged upon the president, after the adoption of that measure, the equipment and manning of all the vessels remaining in the navy. For this measure he urged the motives of assuming an imposing attitude in aid of negotiation, of being prepared in the event of a war, and of alleviating the distress of the class of citizens on whom the pressure of the embargo fell most severely.

In these views Dewitt Clinton concurred most cordially with his uncle; and we have seen that when the defence of the harbour of New-York was neglected by the government, he was the principal instrument in obtaining appropriations from the state for the purpose.

When the distress produced by the embargo became so serious as to threaten a loss of the majorities which the democratic party had hitherto commanded, Dewitt Clinton presided at a meeting in the Park, which pledged itself to the support of the administration on that measure, which nothing but the belief of its being a preparation for war could have rendered tolerable.

To the feeble and inefficient measures of non-importation and non-intercourse which succeeded the embargo, Clinton was decidedly opposed. He viewed them as imposing all the privations of a war without any of its advantages, and urged the adoption of a more energetic course.

When Jefferson, in pursuance of the example of self-denial set by Washington, retired from the presidential chair, the claims of George Clinton to the succession were passed over. His advanced age was a sufficient reason for this; but there were not a few of the democratic party who would even then have desired that Dewitt Clinton should have been the candidate. At the caucus of members of Congress by whom Madison was nominated as the successor of Jefferson, ninety-four were present. Of these only one was from New-York, and the attendance from Virginia was not full. The members from New-York who did not attend were understood to prefer George Clinton, and the absentees from Virginia to be in favour of Monroe. In the decision of this caucus Clinton and his friends acquiesced in silence; but the jealousy of the growing power of New-York, and particularly of the rising talents and influence of Dewitt Clinton, were powerfully excited in the breasts of those who desired to perpetuate the ascendancy of Virginia.

This state of mind in the immediate personal adherents of the president became apparent to Dewitt Clinton when he, in pursuance of the act of the Legislature of 1811, visited Washington for the purpose of soliciting aid for the prosecution of the New-York canals. The doctrine that it was not within the delegated powers of the general government to grant such aid had not then been invented; the neglect of all measures preparatory to a war, or necessary for defence, had left the government in possession of ample funds, and thus, to all appearance, there was nothing but sectional jealousy which could prevent such aid being furnished.

During the succeeding session of Congress, active measures were taken for creating an army and making provision for defence, or even for acting hostilely against Great Britain. In these preparatory measures Clinton concurred, and they were supported in Congress by the votes of his immediate friends and the exertion of all his influence. When, however, in June, 1812, the final question of war or peace at that precise moment was entertained, he appears to have been of the opinion that, however just and necessary a war with Great Britain were, the juncture was unfavourable, and the country was not in a sufficient state of preparation. In these views he was countenanced by a great number of the most uniform and consistent members of the party; a number so great, that, when added to the opposition members, it was believed, by the most adroit politicians, that a declaration of war could hardly be carried in the House of Representatives, and must certainly fail in the Senate. The course of political management by which an apparent minority was suddenly and unexpectedly converted into a majority, is still unexplained. With this majority the immediate friends of Clinton voted; thus showing, whatever hesitation he may have felt in respect to the policy of making war at the moment, a hesitation which many believe was shared by the president himself, that, when it was decided upon as the measure of the party, he was willing to give it his support.

The nomination by a caucus of members of Congress had become odious to many. Hence, when Madison’s first term was about to expire, no more than twelve persons from states east of New-Jersey attended the meeting. From this caucus Madison received a nomination for a second term. Those republicans who objected to the usage of a caucus, and refused to obey its commands, fixed their eyes upon Clinton as an opponent to the nominee of this meeting. Clinton was, in consequence, put in nomination; and, when the electoral votes were counted, was found to have received 89, while Madison was elected by 128 votes.

In permitting himself to be used as a candidate, Clinton exposed himself to great obloquy. Two different parties were interested in misrepresenting his views and opinions. The supporters of Madison, on the one hand, were anxious that Clinton should be represented as an opponent of the war, believing that they would thus lessen his popularity and diminish the vote for him as president. The federal party, on the other hand, were willing to consider him as opposed to the war, as by this they might consistently vote for him, and obtain an opportunity for distracting the ranks of their ancient opponents. He was even strongly urged to declare himself upon this point; and, had he given the least encouragement to a report that he was the opponent of the war, he might have secured the almost undivided support of the federal party. This would probably have secured his election, for that party was still strong and well organized. Into the latter plan Clinton declined to enter; and thus, if he may have received the vote of a few federalists, he derived no aid from them as a party, except in the Eastern states, where he was chosen as the least of two evils. His decision on this point left a feeling of animosity in the minds of many distinguished opponents of the administration, which arrayed them ever after with whatever party sought the downfall of Clinton.

The nomination of Clinton was made by a convention of the republican party of the State of New-York. Many persons who were afterward his most bitter opponents concurred in the call, and gave their support to his nomination. The electoral ticket which voted for him was headed by the gentleman who was subsequently the successful candidate of the party which opposed Clinton’s administration as governor.

This was the first attempt to put down the caucus system, which has been followed by the very method of conventions that was adopted by the friends of Clinton; and although he for a time became the sacrifice of the new principle, it has, notwithstanding, been triumphant, and is now universally admitted to be pre-eminently republican.

The main cause assigned by the convention for putting Clinton in nomination for the presidency was, that hostilities might be conducted in a more efficient manner. The early operations of the war were attended with discomfiture and disgrace; and it was most earnestly desired, by many sincere well-wishers of their country, that a man of Clinton’s decision, capacity, and judgment should take the place of what they considered a feeble and vacillating administration. The truth is, however unpopular may be the declaration of it, that a war, commenced without preparation, was carried on without a plan; and the force which, if united, might have penetrated to the walls of Quebec, was engaged in partial and inconclusive conflicts over a thousand miles of frontier.

So far from attempting to embarrass the government in the prosecution of the war, Clinton was the first official personage who came out publicly to arouse his countrymen to that strenuous and unanimous support of the cause of their country by which alone the war could be brought to a happy issue. An opportunity was afforded him for this purpose in his charge to the grand jury of the City and County of New-York, before a month had elapsed from the date of the declaration of war. In this charge, after pointing out the new relations in which the country had been placed, he explains to the grand jury its duty in inquiring into such acts as by these new relations had become crimes.

It is therefore clear, that the charge of being opposed to a war with Great Britain, which has been so often urged against him, is devoid of foundation. Even had he been one of its most strenuous opponents at the beginning, he would have stood in no worse light than others, who, however violent they had been in their resistance to a declaration of war, were, notwithstanding, relieved from all imputations of want of patriotism, in consequence of the support which they afforded to the government in carrying it on.

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Transcribed from the original text and html prepared by Bill Carr, last updated 12/10/99.