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Letter from Governor Clinton to the Rev. John Stanford, relative to the case of Miller under sentence of death for murder.

ALBANY, January 21^st, 1828.

REV. SIR,

I have received your representation of the state of William Miller, under sentence of death for murder. Although I have no doubt of the right of government to inflict the punishment of death in certain cases, yet I always feel the utmost anxiety, when pardoning power is appealed to on such occasions. To mingle justice with mercy, and to preserve a human being from death, without violating those precautions which are necessary for the welfare of human society, is indeed an important trust. A momentous power which ought to be exercised with caution, with prudence, and with a humble reliance upon divine Providence.

I have considered the case of William Miller over and over again, and with the most profound solicitude: and I can come to no other conclusion, than that which was sanctioned by a jury of the country. His crime, in my opinion, is a clear case of murder, perpetrated under circumstances of barbarity, with intermissions of violence which left ample room for reflection, and without any extenuation but drunkenness, if that can be so considered, and followed by declarations of the most unfeeling character. Under this aspect of the case, I cannot interpose the pardoning power, without a violation of the most sacred and solemn duties.

Accept, worthy and venerable sir, the assurances of my great respect and continued friendship.

DE WITT CLINTON.

REV. JOHN STANDFORD.

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Governor Clinton's Letter to Judge Edwards.

ALBANY, February 5^th, 1828.

SIR,

I received in due season from you, as presiding judge of a court of Oyer and Terminer, held in and for the city and county of New-York, minutes of the trial of William Miller, on the 10^th of December last, for the murder of David Ackerman, by which it appears that he was duly convicted of the crime, and sentenced to be executed on the 26^th of January last. After an attentive perusal and deliberate consideration of this and the accompanying documents, and of the papers sent up by Mr. E. King, one of the counsel assigned for the prisoner by the court, and several conferences with Mr. R. Emmet, the other counsel, I came to the same conclusion with the court and jury, that the prisoner was guilty, and that therefore the executive ought not to interfere in his favour. This decision I communicated to Mr. Emmet on the morning of the 19^th ultimo, as my definitive determination. Shortly after, on opening some letters on my table, I found a communication from you, and a duplicate relative to this subject, in which you announced a change in your views, and assigned your reasons. I then mentioned to Mr. Emmet that I would look over your communication and reconsider the case, and inform him of the result on Monday - at which time I told him that I could not reconcile it with my sense of duty, and my views of the subject, to interpose, either by a change or remission of the punishment, and that the law must take its course: on the same evening I wrote a letter of a similar import to the Rev. Mr. Stanford, chaplain of the prison, in answer to one received from him, so that the convict might be prepared as far as possible for the awful fate that awaited him. On the evening of the 27^th January, I received, to my great surprise, a letter from you informing me that the Court of Oyer and Terminer had considered it their duty to reprieve the convict until the 16^th of this month. On taking the subject into consideration, I have no doubt that the court, with pure motives, mistook their powers, and my only object in making this declaration is to prevent the act to which I except from being drawn into precedent. The constitution entrusts the governor with power over reprieves and pardons, and I think that from the very terms it is exclusive.

The power claimed in this case by the court over which you preside, has never before been exercised in this country - it is incompatible with the arrangements of our government - against the constitution, and pregnant with the most mischievous results. It has been claimed in extraordinary cases by the judges in England, but the great commentator who concedes it, qualifies the concession by saying that it is rather by common usage than of strict right. The judges are emanations of the regal power; and even the king himself, in his regal office, and not his person, is always present in the eye of the law in all his courts. Our government is divided into three great departments - legislative, executive, and judicial. Our judiciary, as well as the others, must look for its powers in the grants of the constitution. Now it must be admitted, that the power that reprieves or pardons, is an executive power expressly delegated - and, however it may be represented in Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone, they can be of no authority on this occasion. There may be emergent cases in which reprieves or pardons ought to be granted - in cases of pregnancy, insanity, or unexpected discovery of innocence. In these cases, if the executive power cannot operate, in all probability, the sheriff, relying on the justice of his country, might take the risk upon himself, and without any pretence of authority, exercise mercy upon indeed an awful responsibility. But this case is a different one - it is a claim of right - and the pernicious consequences to which it may lead, are obvious. There is a court of Oyer and Terminer in every county, and there are 56 counties. Admit the power over reprieves to be in fifty-six courts - admit that these courts are more or less trustworthy, more or less liable to deception - may they not in many cases prostrate justice, and adopt measures of the most injurious tendency? The power of the executive may be completely overthrown in this respect; for, if a court may respite for a day, they may for a year; and on the exhibition of new testimony, they may try over a criminal, and declare him innocent, whom before they had pronounced guilty, and act as a respiting power: there will be no certainty in punishment - a virtual pardoning power will be established in each county, instead of one express pardoning power for the whole state! And, if the judiciary be exposed to sudden and powerful attempts on its humanity, as is probable in the present case, to suspend the sentence of the law, what must be the effect on the executive when it comes before him backed by judicial authority - a prevalent sentiment against the punishment of death - a reluctance in the firmest minds to accede to it - plausible reasons for a milder course - and conflicting opinions about the right of infliction after an intermeddling with the sentence? Will not the executive, in almost every case, be compelled to change the punishment; and in the present instance, which has been pronounced by the judges and jury the crime of murder, and which I may still believe so, with all due deference to the opinion of the court, I am compelled by the extraordinary circumstances, embarrassments, and perplexities attending it, to interfere with a conditional pardon. And as the course to which I except is obnoxious to so many objections, and may be productive of so many evils, and is without precedent, so I sincerely hope that it may be without imitation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

DE WITT CLINTON.

The Hon. JUDGE EDWARDS.

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Transcribed from the original text and html prepared by Bill Carr, last updated 5/22/99.